Inside Iran’s Shadow Delegation to Moscow: A Quiet Sprint Toward the Bomb
Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf addresses mourners in Tehran last month during a memorial service for Iran’s nuclear scientists who were killed in Israeli attacks in June © Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto/Reuters
On the surface, it looked like an unremarkable flight. Mahan Air Flight W598 from Tehran touched down at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo International Airport at 9:40am on August 4, 2024. Among its passengers: a group of seemingly ordinary Iranian scientists and consultants from a firm called DamavandTec. But beneath this innocuous cover lay one of the most significant and alarming developments in the Islamic Republic’s long-running nuclear subterfuge.
According to a sweeping and meticulously sourced Financial Times investigation, the men aboard that plane were no ordinary civilians. They were emissaries of Iran’s most secretive and dangerous military research unit: the Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research—better known by its Persian acronym, SPND—an entity long believed to be the institutional heir to Iran’s shelved (but never abandoned) nuclear weapons program.
Their purpose? To engage with high-level Russian defense-linked scientific institutes, seek sensitive dual-use technologies, and—perhaps most explosively—request tritium: a radioactive isotope used to supercharge nuclear warheads.
SPND: The Ghost of Iran’s Nuclear Past
Established in 2011 by the late physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, SPND has been the epicenter of Iran’s covert nuclear research since the early 2000s. Western intelligence agencies believe it took over the nuclear weapons work from the Amad Plan, which was officially halted in 2003 by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—yet clearly remained dormant, waiting to be reactivated when politically convenient.
For over a decade, SPND operated in the shadows, acquiring dual-use technology through front companies, ambiguous scientific partnerships, and carefully curated academic collaborations. It has repeatedly been sanctioned by the U.S. government for its work on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. And in 2024, the Iranian parliament—under Khamenei’s direct supervision—formally institutionalized SPND, shielding its budget from oversight and giving it the authority to spin off civilian-seeming entities like DamavandTec.
DamavandTec: A False Front with a Dangerous Mission
DamavandTec presents itself as a consulting firm focused on "technology transfer" and scientific exchange. But beneath this bureaucratic veneer lies a tight-knit network of SPND-linked figures, all with deep ties to Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure.
Leading the delegation was Ali Kalvand, a fluent Russian speaker and nuclear physicist trained in Ukraine. His company’s board includes individuals with backgrounds in sanctioned defense firms, including Ali Bakouei, a nuclear physicist who served as Iran’s scientific envoy to Russia.
The FT reports that in early 2024, Kalvand received a formal request from Iran’s defense ministry to organize a highly sensitive visit to Moscow—one that would include nuclear scientists, procurement agents, and a military counterintelligence officer.
All five delegates traveled on diplomatic service passports, issued within days of each other, bearing sequential numbers—clear evidence of official government authorization.
The Delegates: Iran’s Nuclear Elite
Among the delegates:
Javad Ghasemi, previously CEO of Paradise Medical Pioneers, a sanctioned SPND procurement front. He now heads Imen Gostar Raman Kish, a radiation equipment supplier with direct ties to the IRGC and Iran’s ballistic missile program.
Rouhollah Azimirad, a senior SPND scientist and associate professor at Malek Ashtar University of Technology, sanctioned by the UK and EU. His expertise lies in radiation detection and transport—critical for nuclear weapons diagnostics.
Soroush Mohtashami, perhaps the most consequential delegate. A specialist in neutron generators—a key component in nuclear weapons detonation—his PhD was supervised by Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani, the mastermind of the Amad Plan. According to experts, Mohtashami’s work connects directly to Iran’s historical weapons design efforts.
Amir Yazdian, a defense ministry counterintelligence officer, with no public scientific or academic profile. His presence reflects standard practice in Iranian sensitive missions—both as protection and surveillance.
The Russian Connection: Loosened Restraints in a Post-Ukraine World
The group visited Toriy, Tekhnoekspert, and BTKVP, defense-linked scientific institutes owned by 78-year-old Russian scientist Oleg Maslennikov. These institutes specialize in:
Klystrons, used in flash X-ray systems for non-explosive nuclear implosion testing;
Vacuum induction furnaces, used to melt and shape weapons-grade uranium;
Electron accelerators, closely resembling those used in nuclear diagnostics.
Maslennikov’s ties to Russia’s GRU-controlled defense research center and his history of publishing academic papers on diagnostic tools for nuclear tests make his collaboration with the Iranians deeply concerning.
Experts consulted by the FT, including David Albright and Matthew Bunn, stress that such meetings would require at least tacit approval from Russia’s FSB security service. In today’s geopolitical context, with Russia isolated over Ukraine and increasingly allied with Iran, such collaboration is no longer unthinkable—it’s tactical.
As Pranay Vaddi, former senior U.S. NSC official, noted, "We shouldn’t pretend Russia hasn’t changed its view... Non-proliferation is now just another chip in their geopolitical poker game."
The Smoking Gun: Tritium
Perhaps the most damning revelation: a formal letter from Kalvand to Russian isotope supplier Ritverc, requesting three radioactive isotopes, including tritium. While tritium has limited civilian uses, its primary application is in boosting nuclear warhead yields.
Requests for tritium are treated with the highest suspicion by non-proliferation experts.
“Anybody asks for tritium, and I automatically assume weapons,” said William Alberque, former head of NATO's WMD non-proliferation office. "Add klystrons to that and it’s game over."
While the FT found no evidence that the request was fulfilled, the act of seeking tritium by an SPND-linked delegation is, in and of itself, cause for alarm.
Aftermath: Israel Strikes, But the Knowledge Remains
Less than a year after the Moscow visit, on June 20, 2025, during Israel’s sweeping military operation against Iran, the IDF announced it had struck the “headquarters of the SPND nuclear project.” Among those killed was Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani, mentor to Mohtashami and the regime’s most notorious nuclear strategist.
At least eleven nuclear scientists were killed in the strikes. But as several experts told the FT, the real threat isn’t just infrastructure—it’s continuity. The personnel networks, institutional memory, and strategic know-how of SPND have been carefully preserved and passed down.
“Iran can rebuild,” said Carnegie’s Nicole Grajewski. “Because one of the things they did right was training a new generation.”
A Nuclear Program in the Shadows—Still Marching Forward
For decades, Western policymakers have clung to the hope that Iran's nuclear ambitions could be checked through diplomacy, oversight, and deterrence. But the findings revealed by the FT paint a chilling picture of a regime that has simply evolved its methods—hiding in plain sight, using civilian covers, academic cooperation, and scientific ambiguity to continue its march toward weaponization.
While Iran continues to deny the existence of a nuclear weapons program, the Kalvand delegation is yet another data point in a long, damning trail.
As the regime sinks deeper into crisis—under economic strain, social revolt, and external military pressure—it appears more determined than ever to obtain the ultimate insurance policy: a bomb.
After all, as Abbasi-Davani chillingly stated before his death: “Our power lies in our scientists.”
He may have been right.